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Abstract 
 
Development of accident models based on cause and effect relationships facilitates 
the formulation of accident prevention and mitigation plans in the Chemical Process 
Industries (CPIs). In this paper, failures of accident prevention barriers triggered by man-
made and natural hazards are causally modeled using Fault Trees (FTs) models. 
Additionally, updated technique of FTs basic and top events failure probabilities was 
applied using Hierarchy Bayesian Approach (HBA) based on basic events precursor 
data. This updated methodology overcomes the uncertainty limitation in the 
determination of FTs reliability data, as well as converge them into their accurate 
values. Moreover, it provides valuable information supporting risk based decision. The 
methodology was applied to LNG pipeline and liquefaction plant Dispersion 
Prevention Barrier (DPB). The result shows the capability of the methodology to model 
natural and security hazards (NE&ISHs) in both qualitative and quantitative manners, 
as well as, to update FT events failure probabilities through the use of the precursor 
data to the HBA. Outcomes demonstrate that the average posterior failure probability 
of DPB of that particular case study increased from 0.0613 to 0.204232 which represents 
a 3.33 times increment compared with the prior.   
 
Keywords: Accident Modeling, Intentional Security Hazards, Natural Hazards, Hierarchy 
Bayesian Approach (HBA), Precursor data. 
 
Abstrak 
 
Pembangunan model kemalangan berdasarkan sebab dan akibat antara 
kemudahan hubungan penggubalan pencegahan dan mitigasi pelan kemalangan 
dalam Proses Kimia Industri CPIs . Dalam kajianini , kegagalan pencegahan 
kemalangan dicetuskan oleh faktor buatan manusia dan bencana alam semulajadi 
adalah dimodelkan menggunakan Fault Trees (FTS) model. Selain itu, teknik FTS 
kebarangkalian  kegagalan  peristiwa asas dan popular telah dikemaskini dengan 
menggunakan Hierarki Pendekatan Bayesian (HBA) berdasarkan pelopor data 
peristiwa asas. Metodologi yang telah dikemaskini  mengatasi masalah had 
ketidakpastian dalam penentuan kebolehpercayaan data FTS, dan juga 
menghubungkan data-data tersebut pada  nilai-nilai yang tepat, tambahan pula; ia 
menyediakan maklumat yang berharga untuk menyokong keputusan berdasarkan 
risiko.Metodologi telah digunakan untuk saluran paip LNG dan loji pencairan Serakan 
Pencegahan Barrier ( DPB ). Hasilnya menunjukkan keupayaan kaedah untuk natural 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
In the chemical process industry, accidents and loss of 
containment are often the result of material and/or 
energy releases triggered by one or combinations of 
process hazards such as technical and operational 
errors, human intervention faults, as well as 
management and organizational factors [1]. Due to the 
complex nature of these factors, there is a need to 
systematically model their interactions and relationships 
with the succeeding adverse consequences. The 
modeling of why failures are triggered and the 
occurrence of the subsequent accident is called 
accident modeling [2]. Over the years, a number of 
accident models have been put forward [3], with some 
specifically addressing hazards associated with 
processes, natural events and security.  
Although process hazards are the main reason for the 
loss of containment (LOC) in process industries, other 
hazards such as unwanted natural phenomena and 
intentional security acts threats also contributed 
substantially [4-8]. In fact, natural phenomena and 
intentional security related hazards are likely to cause 
more severe impacts due to wide area of coverage as 
well as the high possibilities of simultaneous and 
cascading accidents. In addition, these hazards also 
hamper emergency responses and rescue plans, thus 
making the affected people and properties more 
vulnerable. 
Accidents triggered by natural events are known in 
the field of CPI as Na-Tech accidents. An earlier study 
on Na-Tech related accidents in the CPI in the USA 
revealed the varying impacts depending on the 
frequency and severity on the events occurring in 
specific regions, but it was nevertheless alarming since 
the trend of  Na-Tech accidents was on the rise [9]. The 
various risks based on climate change and 
geographical aspects are also thought to be the 
dominant factors that influence the increase in 
numerous incidents [10, 11]. To name a few, some 
examples of Na-Tech related accidents can be found 
in [4, 12-16]. In addition to losses of human life and 
property, Na-Tech disasters also cause considerable 
ecological damages to soil and groundwater due to 
leakage of chemicals, polluted drinking water and 
endangerment to the health of humans and animals 
[17]. 
Similarly to Na-Tech, security hazards also contribute to 
accidents in the CPI in many possible ways leading to 
release of toxic and/or flammable materials and their 
subsequent unwanted events [7, 8]. The call for 
considering these hazards came from the available 
statistical information of accidents that have been 
taken place in CPIs. For example, 88 security related 
accidents to oil and gas facilities worldwide were 
reported in the period of 1980-2000 [18]. In another 
report, Chang and Lin [19] listed 18 CPI storage tank 
accidents triggered by terrorism and sabotage in the 
period of 1960-2003, and showed that security hazards 
were the fourth frequent causes of storage tanks 
accidents. 
A number of methodologies have been developed to 
assess the CPI risks due to natural events, as well as to 
prevent and mitigate their consequences. Among 
these, quantitative risk assessment (QRA) methodology 
is regarded as the most powerful tool [15, 20-28]. 
However, a full-blown QRA requires huge resources in 
terms of time, data, and expertise. To overcome this 
issue, Busini et. al., [29] developed a qualitative short cut 
method to assess risk due to seismic event, and the 
methodology has three hierarchies of Na-Tech that 
lead to produce three key hazard indicators (KHI) for 
ﬁres, toxic dispersion, and explosion. This short cut 
methodology showed a good agreement comparing 
with QRA [29]. Cruz and Okada [14] developed a rapid 
Na-Tech risk assessment (RNRA) methodology that 
identifies, quantifies, and analyzes the risk posed by the 
presence of hazardous materials in areas subject to 
natural hazard risk. However, these methodologies 
focus only on specific natural events, whereas in actual 
situations, different natural events may combine to 
produce new accident modes. Most of these 
methodologies focus only on a specific natural event, 
whereas different natural events may combine and 
produce some new accident modes. Typical of 
simplified methods, some aspects that may be 
important are neglected e.g. RNRA methodology 
slightly considers the direct impacts on the 
environment, as well as it doesn’t include other 
important impacts such as economic, psychological, 
and potential processing hazmat releases impacts from 
vessels and pipeline.  
Similarly, assessment methodologies for security risks 
have also been developed. Jaeger [30] proposed a 
and security hazards (NE & ISHs ) model dalam  mengikut cara kedua-dua kualitatif 
dan kuantitatif, dan juga, untuk mengemaskini kegagalan peristiwa FT kebarangkalian 
melalui penggunaan data pelopor kepada HBA . Hasil menunjukkan bahawa purata 
kebarangkalian kegagalan posterior DPB hasil darikajian kes tertentu telah meningkat 
dari 0.0613 ke 0.204232 yang mewakili 3.33 kali peningkatan berbanding dengan 
sebelumnya. 
 
Kata kunci: Pemodelan Kemalangan, Sengaja Bahaya Keselamatan, Bencana Alam, 
Pendekatan Bayesian Hierarki (HBA), Data Prekursor. 
 
© 2015 Penerbit UTM Press. All rights reserved 
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systematic CPI security vulnerability assessment 
methodology for terrorist or criminal attacks. This was 
followed by a series of development by Gupta and co-
workers [5, 31]. Initially, a three stage methodology was 
proposed to assess the individual and overall risk of the 
facility. The stages were Threat Analysis (TA), 
Vulnerability Analysis (VA), and Security Risk Factor 
Table (SRFT) [5, 31]. In a later work, the SRFT was 
extended by adding a Stepped Matrix Procedure (SMP) 
to study the vulnerability among the domino effect 
scenario through the use of threat events [32]. Along 
another route, Reniers and co-workers [33-35] 
developed methodologies based on game theory to 
evaluate different strategic precautionary measures to 
deal with security threats. Later Reniers et al., [36] 
proposed a Threat Assessment Review Planning (TARP) 
methodology that optimizes threat assessment 
planning activities through  systematic  planning 
procedure that objectively determines the need for 
threat assessments, in each facility and can be 
extended to  organization-wide scale. 
This paper introduces a methodology to assess risk to 
CPI process facility caused by natural events (including 
earthquake, flooding, lightening,  and storm) and 
intentional security acts in one framework. The 
proposed methodology has quantitative outcomes 
and dynamics features through the use of real time 
data and hierarchal Bayesian approach. This updating 
mechanism of prior knowledge supports risk based 
decision through prioritizing facilities plans and 
management of change for safer plants against these 
hazards. 
 
2.0  METHODOLOGY FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1  Modeling CPI Natural and Intentional Security 
Hazards (NE&ISHs) 
 
Prevention barriers (PBs) of chemical processes can be 
introduced sequentially as release (RPB), dispresion 
(DPB), ignition (IPB), escalation (EPB), and damage 
control & emergency management (DC&EMPB) [1, 37]. 
Note that the basic layer of protection, i.e., process 
control, alarm, interlock and relief devices, is 
considered as part of RPB that prevents process upset 
from being propagated to release. Abnormal release of 
unwanted initiating event can occur if all four layer of 
protections failed, either consecutively or 
simultaneously or due to maintenance and structural 
failures. Fig 1 shows accident sequence in CPI with the 
end-state events depending on the success or failure of 
the prevention barriers. 
Using this modeling paradigm, the causal models of 
failures triggered by natural hazards and deliberate 
acts to all accident prevention barriers of a LNG 
processing facility, i.e., RPB, DPB, IPB, EPB, DC&EMPB, 
are developed using Fault Tree models. Within each FT 
model, all potential hazards associated to plant 
operation and management aspects, including 
operational and technical, structure and design, 
components, human, and, management and 
organizational factors, are considered and 
incorporated. Models’ outcomes provide quantitative 
estimations of the contributions of Na-Tech and 
Intentional Security Hazards (NE&ISHs) on the failure 
probabilities of process prevention barriers. 
Process unsafe 
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Near-miss
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Incident 
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Figure 1 Prevention barriers applied in CPI accident sequence 
 
 
Using this modeling paradigm, the causal models of 
failures triggered by natural hazards and deliberate 
acts to all accident prevention barriers of a LNG 
processing facility, i.e., RPB, DPB, IPB, EPB, DC&EMPB, 
are developed using Fault Tree models. Within each FT 
model, all potential hazards associated to plant 
operation and management aspects, including 
operational and technical, structure and design, 
components, human, and, management and 
organizational factors, are considered and 
incorporated. Models’ outcomes provide quantitative 
estimations of the contributions of Na-Tech and 
Intentional Security Hazards (NE&ISHs) on the failure 
probabilities of process prevention barriers. 
 
2.2  Barriers and Basic Events Probability Updating 
 
The failure probabilities obtained from the previous part 
are the priors of accident prevention barriers due to 
NE&ISHs. These priors are estimated using the reliability 
data available on basic events, as well as experts’ 
opinions for cases where data are unattainable. To 
improve confidence of the reliablilty data, updating 
methodology based plant’s precursor data is 
introduced. The updates also provide dynamics to the 
prevention barriers and basic events failure 
probabilities, which in turn help supporting risk based 
decisions for more effective management plans. This 
can be conveniently achieved by employing Bayesian 
approach [38-48]. 
In Bayesian approach, the prior and likelihood 
functions are represented by conjugate pair of 
distribution functions e.g. Gamma-Poisson and Beta-
Binomial pairs, hence Gamma and Beta are the priors, 
and Poisson and Binomial are the likelihood functions. 
Since the priors have significant effects on the 
20                                     Ali Al-shanini et al. / Jurnal Teknologi (Sciences & Engineering) 75:6 (2015) 17–25 
 
 
estimated posteriors, a good prior knowledge is 
important. However, due to the lack of reliability data, 
the determination of prior distribution shaping 
parameters is not straightforward. Because of this 
reason, a hyper-prior distribution is used to allow a more 
flexible way to express the prior uncertainty and 
provides more consistent results [49]. In hyper-prior 
distribution, the shaping parameters are represented as 
distribution functions instead of as fixed value 
parameters. This model is known as hierarchy Bayesian 
approach HBA. HBA is multistage prior distributions that 
could consist of two stages or more. However, the use 
of more than two stages is rare in the applications 50. 
The two-stage hierarchical Bayesian approach was 
firstly introduced by Stan Kaplan [51] in which the prior 
distribution for the parameter of interest is represented 
as: 
1 2( ) ( \ ) ( )d       

                       (1) 
Here, θ is the interested parameter, φ is the vector of 
(α,β)T, π1(θ\φ) denotes the first stage prior, and π2(φ) 
denotes the hyper-prior distribution that represents the 
uncertainty in φ.  
In this study, Poisson distribution (Eq.2) is used for each 
source data x 
parameter used to determine the prior’s posterior 
probability \x,t) which represents the updated 
failure frequency of basic event for each data source 
at each time interval. 
( )
( \ ) , 0
!
x tt e
f x for x
x



                        (2) 
sources xi, a first stage Gamma prior distribution is used. 
That the first stage prior in Eq. 1 will be as: 
1
1( \ , ) , 0
( )
e
for x
   
   

 
 

            (3) 
Hence, α and β are the hyper parameters that are 
introduced as distribution functions of Gamma. 
Numerical optimization techniques that maximize 
Poisson likelihood function can be used to determine 
the values of the shaping hyper-prior parameters of 
Gamma distributions of  α and β [51]. Ity is often the 
case that expert opinions are used to assume the hyper-
prior shaping parameters as done by Yang et. al., [52]. 
Fig. 2 represents the hierarchy Bayesian model in its 
Bayesian network directed acyclic graph TAG. Each 
TAG represents a node of a random variable of interest. 
The assumed parameters of α and β define the shape 
of the distribution and are independent of the other 
variables. Nevertheless, once data on the failure events 
are fed to the model, these values will be recomputed 
based on the observed data, and hence become 
dependent of the incident data [50].  
α β 
1 2 n
x1 x2 xn
. . .
. . .
 
Figure 2 Directed acyclic graph for hierarchical Bayes model 
[50] 
 
That, the posterior distribution of 
average of the posterior distributions of 
conditionally depends on α and β and are weighted by 
their posterior distributions, represented as [50]:  
1 2( \ , ) ( \ , , , ) ( , \ , )i x t i x t x t d d                (7)            
By using sampling technique, α and β are sampled from 
their joint posterior distribution, and then sampling  
from the Gamma distribution using Markovian Chain 
Monte Carlo simulation MCMC (WinBUGS software) for 
each discrete time interval, and then the posterior 
failure probabilities of basic events are obtained. 
 
 
3.0  CASE STUDY 
 
The developed methodology is applied to (X) LNG 
liquefaction facility including pipeline (from reservoirs to 
liquefaction plant) and export offshore platform to 
estimate the failure probability of accident prevention 
barriers produced by NE&ISHs. Fig 3 shows the important 
site information of risk assessment. 
 
3.1  Process Description 
 
The plant productivity is 6.7 million cubic metric tons of 
LNG per year. The plant is fed by 1,140 million standard 
cubic feet of natural gas per day. It is supplied by a 320 
km length pipeline with 38 inch diameter. The pipeline 
passes through two states in the country (Y) mainly in 
the desert and thinly populated region to reduce the 
impact to livelihoods in case of accidents. However, it 
also closely passes oil fields in these two states. The 
liquefaction plant is situated at coastal area with a 
distance of 25-30 km from small towns. Main highway 
passes approximately 2km from the plant perimeter. 
The liquefaction process used in the plant is propane 
pre-cooled mixed refrigerant (C3MR). The process units 
involved in operation include acid removal, 
dehydration, propane refrigeration, heavy 
hydrocarbons removal, and storage tanks. The LNG is 
transferred by ships through offshore platform terminal. 
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The plant is divided into areas as illustrated in Fig. 3. It is 
categorized into four different security zones of Z0, Z1, 
Z2 and Z3, which are low- risk areas, moderate-risk 
areas, high-risk areas, and critical-risk areas 
respectively. The pipeline is situated in low educated 
tribal areas that have weapons. With regards to natural 
events, plants from this region, from reservoirs to export 
platform, have not recorded high strength natural 
events. 
 
3.2  Risk Assessment 
 
LNG is a hazard substance due to its cryogenic, 
flammability properties, and its vapor dispersion 
characteristics. LNG's boiling point is (-162oC) at a 
pressure of 1.7 KPa. Direct contact to LNG can cause 
damage to both skin and metals. Its flammability in the 
air is within the range of 5% to 15% volume fraction. The 
release of natural gas or its liquefied form could 
produce flammable cloud, which when ignited could 
result to flash fire or/and vapor cloud explosion. Spillage 
of LNG may form a pool and forms pool fire if ignited, 
and if the liquid spills in water,  explosion may occur due 
to a phenomenon known as “Rapid Phase Transition”. 
Furthermore, the facility contains high presurrised 
propane in spherical tank that can produce BLEVE. 
  
 
4.0  RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1  Barriers Prior Probability Estimation 
 
The FT models of prevention barriers failure caused by 
NE&ISHs for the LNG case study are as shown in Fig4, 
Fig5, Fig6, Fig7, and Fig8. Basic events failure 
probabilities are obtained from plant's specific data, 
experts' opinions, and published literatures [48, 53-56]. 
By simulating the FTs, failure probabilities of the 
prevention barriers triggered by NE&SHs are obtained 
and shown in Table 1. 
1
23
4
56
7
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9
1011
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13
14
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18
19
19
20
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pipeline
(21)
22
23
24
1. LNG storage tanks area
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5. Propane & refrigerant storage
6. Sea water pumps area
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9. Fire water pump & emergency generators
10. Power generators area
11. Chemicals and diesel stores area
12. other facilities (electrical, wirehouse)
13. Fire training area
14. Main gate (entrance) security guard
15. Maintenance buildings
16. Central control room
17. Gas receiver area
18. Platform area
19. Perimeter wall and fence
20. Main pipeline entrance to facility
21. Main pipeline 320 km length
22. NG reservoirs area
23. Oil company(x)
24. The liquefaction plant
25. high way 
26. housing aera
16
17
25
2 Km
19
26
Z0
Z1
Z3
Z2
Z3
Z3
Z1
Z3
Z1
Z2
 
Figure 3 Important site information for risk assessment of the case study 
 
Table 1 Barrier Failure Probabilities by NE&ISHs 
No.  Top event  Prior failure probability 
1 RPB  1.50E-3 
2 DPB 6.13E-2 
3 IPB 9.60E-2 
4 EPB 2.54E-8 
5 DC&EMB 2.90E-3 
 
From Table 1, it is clear that NE&ISHs have more effects 
on increasing the failure probability of IPB followed by 
DPB, DC&EMB, RPB, and EPB respectively. The results of 
FTs simulation are logical due to the fact that the 
prevention of ignition sources triggered by NE&ISHs is a 
difficult target since unexpected intentional acts and 
high strength natural events can overcome the prior 
prevention plans. Ignition can be produced from 
equipment collapse and collision (even friction with 
particle carried by storm), lightning, terrorism/sabotage 
attacks using weapons, and disgruntled employee act 
with ineffective prevention. As mentioned before, 
NE&ISHs are usually associated with human confusion 
and limit human intervention accessibility leading in 
difficulty of controlling loss of containment LOC that 
increases the failure probability of the DPB, as obtained 
in Table 1. 
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4.2  Barriers and Basic Events Probability Updating 
 
The introduced updating methodology is implemented 
to the DPB of the LNG case study. Precursor data of 
failures of basic events of DPB were collected for ten 
discrete time intervals (a month for each interval) as 
shown in Table 2.  
The hyper-prior shaping parameters of α and β 
Gamma hyper-priors distributions are assumed as in 
Table 3. These assumptions are built from experts' 
opinions. Note that the priors means obtained from 
these hyper-priors parameters are equal to the one 
used in FT model. 
The posterior failure probabilities of basic events are 
obtained using MCMC simulation (WinBUGS software) 
of the HBA with the utilization of basic events precursor 
data. The model was run with 10,000 burn samples, and 
then followed by 10,000 iterations for each chain 
converging into the posterior failure probabilities of 
basic events as declared in Table 4, and then the top 
event can be estimated deterministically. 
The posteriors obtained show that the failure 
probabilities of basic events 1, 2, 4, and 7 were 
increased compared to their priors, whereas the 
positeriors of the rest of basic events were decreased. 
Table 5 shows the average of the posteriors of the ten 
intervals. These averages were compared with the 
priors through indication ratio that identifies the times of 
increase or decrease of the average to the prior, in 
which a ratio bigger than 1 means an increase, 
whereas a ratio less than 1 means a decrease. The 
average of DPB failure probability of the case study was 
increased from 0.0613 to 0.204232, which represents a 
3.33 times increase compared with the prior. 
This shows the importance of modified plans for basic 
events that have been increasing in the failure 
probability, and this can be done through e.g. build 
security towers along the 320km pipeline with suitable 
distance between them to cover the critical areas 
around pipeline that allows discovery of any abnormal 
acts, improve operators’ skills in emergency cases 
caused by NE&SHs through trainings, increase patrols. 
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Figure 4 RPB failure caused by NE&ISHs 
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Figure 6 IPB failure caused by NE&ISHs 
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Figure 8 DC&EMB failure caused by NE&ISHs 
 
 
 
Table 2 Plant Specific Accumulative Precursor Data of Number of Basic Events Occurrence 
 
Interval 
(month) 
Number of occurrence of basic events  
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 B11 B12 B13 B14 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 2 2 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 3 2 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 4 2 0 2 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 4 2 0 2 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 5 2 0 2 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 6 2 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 7 3 0 3 0 0 5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
 
 
Figure 7 EPB failure caused by NE& ISHs 
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Table 3 The Assumed Hyper-prior Information of Basic Events 
 
Event 
 
Distribution 
 
Hyper-prior parameters Prior mean 
  β 
B1 Gamma Gamma(2,0.8) Gamma(19,0.38) 0.050 
B2 Gamma Gamma(2.1,0.7) Gamma(33,0.275) 0.025 
B3 Gamma Gamma(3.0,1.0) Gamma(48,0.4) 0.025 
B4 Gamma Gamma(2.0,0.8) Gamma(14,0.28) 0.050 
B5 Gamma Gamma(1.8,0.9) Gamma(40,0.2) 0.010 
B6 Gamma Gamma(2.1,0.6) Gamma(21,0.3) 0.050 
B7 Gamma Gamma(2.0,0.5) Gamma(14,0.175) 0.050 
B8 Gamma Gamma(2.1,0.7) Gamma(21,0.35) 0.050 
B9 Gamma Gamma(3.0,1.0) Gamma(30,0.5) 0.050 
B10 Gamma Gamma(2.1,0.6) Gamma(21,0.3) 0.050 
B11 Gamma Gamma(3.3,0.55) Gamma(24,0.32) 0.080 
B12 Gamma Gamma(2.5,0.625) Gamma(26,0.325) 0.050 
B13 Gamma Gamma(2.1,0.7) Gamma(21,0.35) 0.050 
B14 Gamma Gamma(2.1,0.6) Gamma(21,0.3) 0.050 
 
Table 4 Posterior Mean of Basic and Top Events Failure Probabilities 
 
Table 5: Posterior average failure probabilities of DPB basic and top events 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Event 1st  2nd   3rd  4th  5th  6th  7th  8th  9th  10th  
B1 0.04991 0.048 0.09052 0.1291 0.1684 0.2005 0.1939 0.2285 0.2571 0.2858 
B2 0.02421 0.0241 0.04515 0.06311 0.06232 0.06106 0.0605 0.05869 0.05812 0.07461 
B3 0.02472 0.02442 0.02384 0.02368 0.02348 0.02233 0.02222 0.02203 0.02154 0.02143 
B4 0.050 0.04855 0.09348 0.08974 0.0879 0.1232 0.119 0.112 0.1493 0.1418 
B5 0.009899 0.009767 0.009718 0.009641 0.009633 0.009594 0.009537 0.009525 0.008724 0.008201 
B6 0.05 0.04779 0.04584 0.04431  0.04212 0.0396 0.03905 0.03782 0.03686 0.03524 
B7 0.04952 0.04901 0.08804 0.123 0.1195 0.156 0.1493 0.143 0.1755 0.2034 
B8 0.04903 0.04837 0.045 0.04334 0.04283 0.04031 0.03935 0.03724 0.03626 0.03537 
B9 0.04919 0.04677 0.0466 0.04559 0.04265 0.04201 0.04138 0.04003 0.03924 0.03715 
B10 0.05 0.04779 0.04584 0.04431  0.04212 0.0396 0.03905 0.03782 0.03686 0.03524 
B11 0.07855 0.07598 0.07409 0.07089 0.06928 0.06472 0.06294 0.06165 0.05955 0.08822 
B12 0.04918 0.04896 0.04631 0.04499 0.04242 0.04275 0.03941 0.03985 0.03837 0.03716 
B13 0.04903 0.04837 0.045 0.04334 0.04283 0.04031 0.03935 0.03724 0.03626 0.03537 
B14 0.05 0.04779 0.04584 0.04431  0.04212 0.0396 0.03905 0.03782 0.03686 0.03524 
Top  0.081898 0.078241 0.127172 0.171488 0.208304 0.242325 0.233687 0.265751 0.29711 0.336343 
Event 
Prior 
(P) 
Posterior 
average (POA) 
Ratio (POA / P) 
B1 0.050 0.165173 3.30346 
B2 0.025 0.053187 2.12748 
B3 0.025 0.022969 0.91876 
B4 0.050 0.101497 2.02994 
B5 0.010 0.009424 0.94239 
B6 0.050 0.041863 0.83726 
B7 0.050 0.125627 2.51254 
B8 0.050 0.04171 0.8342 
B9 0.050 0.043061 0.86122 
B10 0.050 0.041863 0.83726 
B11 0.080 0.070587 0.882338 
B12 0.050 0.04294 0.8588 
B13 0.050 0.04171 0.8342 
B14 0.050 0.041863 0.83726 
Top 0.0613 0.204232 3.331683 
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5.0  CONCLUSION 
 
The study developed causal models of accident 
prevention barriers failures triggered by man-made and 
natural hazards that are regarded as high level 
contributed hazards in CPIs accidents. This article will be 
as introduction of future work to develop  a more 
comprehensive CPI accident model through 
combined NE&SHs with the operational and technical 
as introduced in SHIPP model. Furthermore, the study 
has demonstrated the use of Bayesian network (using 
HBA) in precursor based approach to update the failure 
probabilities of FTs basic events which consequently led 
to update the failure probabilities of accident 
prevention barriers. 
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